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Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU: 






The European Union and the Member States seem to be doing as little as they can against 
rule of law backsliding in some of the EU's constituent parts. Each of the EU institutions came 
up with their own plan on what to do, inventing more and more new soft law of questionable 
quality. All that is being done by the institutions seems to reveal one and only one point: 
there is a total disagreement among all the actors involved as to how to sort out the current 
impasse. This inaction helps the powers of the backsliding Member States to consolidate 
their assault on EU's values even further. 
The core question is how to ensure that the EU's own rule of law be upheld. Authors argue 
that the most mature answer to the problems should necessarily involve not only the reform 
of the enforcement mechanisms, but the reform of the Union as such, as supranational law 
should be made more aware of the values it is obliged by the Treaties to respect and aspire 
to protect both at the national and also at the supranational levels. EU law should embrace 
the rule of law as an institutional ideal, which implies, inter alia, eventual substantive 
limitations on the acquis of the Union, as well as taking EU values to heart in the context of 
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The European Union (EU) and the Member States seem to be doing as little as they can to 
combat rule of law backsliding in some of the EU’s constituent parts. Each of the EU 
institutions came up with their own plan on what to do, inventing more and more soft law 
of questionable quality. All that is being done by the institutions appears to reveal one and 
only one point: there is a total disagreement among all the actors involved as to how to sort 
out the current impasse. This inaction assists the powers of the backsliding Member States 
in consolidating their assault upon the EU’s values even further. At least four key legal-
political techniques are used to consolidate the undermining of the rule of law and 
democracy, as the present work shall demonstrate.  
 
The core question is how to ensure the upholding of the EU’s own rule of law. We argue that 
the most mature answer to the problems at hand necessarily requires a long-term 
perspective and involves, besides the reform of the enforcement mechanisms, also the 
reform of the Union as such. Supranational law should be made more aware of the values it 
is obliged by the Treaties to respect and protect, both at the national and supranational 
levels. EU law should embrace the rule of law as an institutional ideal, which implies, inter 
alia, eventual substantive limitations on the acquis of the Union, as well as taking EU values 
to heart in the context of the day-to-day functioning of the Union, elevating them above the 
instrumentalism marking them today.  
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Poland1 has now joined Hungary,2 doubling the number of the Member States where rule of 
law is not safeguarded. While more states could follow, the Union’s position is, apparently, 
very weak: new soft law of questionable quality has been produced by each of the 
institutions,3 while positive change is nowhere to be seen, notwithstanding even the belated 
activation of the Article 7(1) Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU) mechanism.4 
Indeed, the situation seems to be evolving extremely fast and only in the direction of the 
deterioration of the rule of law and abuse by the executive of the independent institutions.5 
It seems that there is a total disagreement among essentially all the actors involved 
concerning what should be done, and the political will to sort out the current impasse is 
lacking at the level of the Member States, too. Supranational political party groups, instead 
of helping, seem to aggravate the situation.6 This inaction helps the powers of the 
backsliding Member States consolidate their assault upon EU’s values even further.  
 
 
                                            
 
 
1 Most importantly: T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-defence’ (2016) 53 Common 
Market Law Review 1753. All websites were accessed on 20 July 2018; T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Capture of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux’ (2018) 43 Review of 
Central and East European Law 116; W. Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-
Constitutional Populist Backsliding’ (2018) Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01. 
2 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution’, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend 
(eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania 
(Hart Publishing, 2015); Z. Szente, ‘Challenging the Basic Values – The Problems with the Rule of Law in Hungary 
and the EU’s Failure to Tackle Them’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values 
(Oxford University Press, 2017) 456; K.L. Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Coups in EU Law’, in M. Adams, A. Meeuse 
and E. Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
3 Council of the EU Press Release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, [2014] 20–21; European 
Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ [2014] COM(2014)158; European Parliament, 
‘Report with Recommendations to the Commission on the Establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights’ [2016] (2015/2254(INL)). Cf. on all these instruments, D. Kochenov, A. 
Magen and L. Pech (eds), ‘The Great Rule of Law Debate in the European Union’ (2016 symposium), (2016) 54(5) 
Journal of Common Market Studies. 
4 K.L. Scheppele and L. Pech, ‘Poland and the European Commission’ (Parts I, II, and III), 3 January, 6 January, 
and 3 March 2017, available at http://verfassungsblog.de/author/laurent-pech/; D. Kochenov and L. Pech, 
‘Better Late Than Never? On the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and Its First Activation’ (2016) 24 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 1062; P. Oliver and J. Stefanelli, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The 
Council’s Inaction’ (2016) 24 Journal of Common Market Studies 1075; but see, E. Hirsch Ballin, ‘Mutual Trust: 
The Virtue of Reciprocity – Strengthening the Acceptance of the Rule of Law through Peer Review’, in C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 
2016). 
5 U. Sedelmeier, ‘Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary 
and Romania after Accession’ (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market Studies 105; J.-W. Müller, ‘The EU as a Militant 
Democracy, or: Are There Limits to Constitutional Mutations within the Member States’ (2014) 165 Revista de 
Estudios Políticos 141; A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area, op. cit.; C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016); A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values: Methods to Achieve Compliance (Oxford University Press, 2017); L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism 
Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3. 
6 R.D. Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union’ 
(2017) 52 Government and Opposition 211. 
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A previously unimaginable situation arose whereby the EU harbours Member States which, 
besides obviously not qualifying for Union membership if they were to apply today, work 
hard to undermine key principles the EU was created to safeguard and promote: democracy, 
the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights.7 The underlying issue is the 
creation of a modus vivendi where the EU’s own instrumentalist understanding of the rule 
of law, including principles such as mutual trust or the autonomy of EU law, reinforces and 
not jeopardises respect for values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.8  
 
The paper starts out by defining the problem, focusing on the nature, and gravity of rule of 
law backsliding in Hungary and Poland in order to outline four key techniques deployed by 
the autocratic regimes in order to consolidate the constitutional capture and massive assault 
on European values. These techniques to achieve, legitimise, and consolidate the destruction 
of the rule of law include: appeals to national sovereignty; fetishisation of ‘constitutional 
identity’ taken out of context; appeals to national security complete with the harassment 
of the media, NGOs, and independent educational institutions; and international 
disinformation campaigns (Part 1). We proceed by discussing the state of the art with regard 
to values in the EU legal system (Part 2); followed by undergoing a normative assessment of 
how these values should preferably be approached (Part 3). Looking at supranational law, 
we argue that the root of the problem is the lack of a sufficient upgrade of the role played 
by values – including the rule of law – when the Union transformed from an ordinary treaty 
organisation into a constitutional system (Part 4). The EU’s powerlessness is among the root 
causes of letting Member States slide into authoritarianism (Part 5). We conclude by arguing 
for shifting the focus of the discussion from the enforcement of the rule of law to the reform 
of the Union as such as a long-term solution (Part 6). There is time: illiberal regimes seem 
to be there to stay, and the options in regard to changing this reality, either supranationally 
or from a grass-roots level, are limited, if not non-existent: we might need to wait ten years 
– or thirty, for that matter – before Hungary and Poland are back on track. In the meantime, 
EU institutions should come to a more subtle realisation of the EU’s constitutional role and 
should not insist on the specificities of EU law trumping all other considerations, including 
respect for the values the EU and the Member States are supposed to share, but should 
instead acknowledge the possibility of potential limitations so as to let the foundations of 
the EU, as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty, evolve. This could definitely be done in the 





                                            
 
 
7 As well as other values expressed in Art. 2 TEU; L. Pech, ‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and 
Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 EU Constitutional Law Review 359; 
D. Kochenov, ‘The Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement of the “Law” Versus the Enforcement of “Values” 
in the EU’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (ed), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit. 
8 M. Klamert and D. Kochenov, ‘Article 2’, in M. Kellerbauer, M. Klamer tand J. Tomkin (eds), EU Treaties and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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1. The EU: From high expectations to jeopardy? 
 
Whereas all Member States suffer from deficiencies in at least some elements of the rule of 
law, in light of a pattern of constitutional capture we focus on rule of law backsliders and 
follow the definition proposed by Pech and Scheppele, according to which rule of law 
backsliding is a ‘process through which elected public authorities deliberately implement 
governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal 
checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching 
the long-term rule of the dominant party.’9 In what follows we shall focus on the two Member 
States that presently satisfy these definitional elements, i.e. Hungary10 and Poland.11  
 
Even though countries acceding to the EU in 2004 had high hopes for joining the democratic 
world after the political changes, the enthusiasm for European values on the side of certain 
Central Eastern European Member States vanished on the way – a phenomenon which was 
unthinkable during the 1989 Eastern European ‘velvet revolutions’. In all these countries, 
the separation of powers had been realised where parliamentary lawmaking procedure 
required extensive consultation with both civil society and opposition parties and crucial 
issues of constitutional concern required a supermajority vote of the Parliament. 
Independent self-governing judicial power ensured that the laws were fairly applied. 
Constitutional scrutiny played a special role in transitional democracies. 
 
After the regime change, Hungary was the first ‘post-communist’ country to join the Council 
of Europe and abide by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR or Convention) in 1990. Poland gained membership in the Council of Europe 
in 1991 and became party to the ECHR in 1993. Hungary and Poland established official 
relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: NATO) already in the 
early 1990s and became NATO members in 1999. They also started accession talks with the 
European Union Member States and signed the EU Association Agreements in the early 1990s, 
which paved the way for full EU membership.12 The Treaty of Accession to the European 
Union was signed in 2003. Hungary, Poland, six other Central and Eastern European countries 
as well as two Mediterranean islands became members of the European Union on 1 May 2004 
as part of the biggest enlargement in the Union’s history.13 The European Union played an 
important role in the transformation of all the Eastern European states and in the context 
                                            
 
 
9 L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within’, op. cit., at 8. 
10 L. Sólyom, ‘The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Culture in Hungary’, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend 
(eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area, op. cit.; M. Bánkuti, G. Halmai and K. L. 
Scheppele, ‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution’ (2012) 23 Journal of Democracy 138.  
11 For an overview of political court-packing and other Polish developments, see, e.g., T. T. Koncewicz, ‘The 
Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond’, op. cit.; W. Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (In 
Poland)’, op. cit. See also The Venice Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on amendments to the 
Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, CDL-AD(2016)001, Venice, 11 March 2016, available 
at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282016%29001-e.  
12 K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of Their Pre-Accession Reorientation’ (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 1173. 
13 A. Ott and K. Inglis (eds), Handbook on European Enlargement (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002). 
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of their democratisation.14 The principle of conditionality was used to achieve this, coupled 
with the presumption that any democratic or rule of law ‘backsliding’ would not be possible 
once the transformation was in place.15 Alongside the Europe Agreements, the Union applied 
the Copenhagen criteria adopted by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council.16 Clearly going 
beyond the scope of the Europe Agreements,17 these criteria became the cornerstone of 
Hungary’s and Poland’s transformations throughout the first decade of this century, 
reshaping the core of EU constitutionalism in the process, too.18 The shocking rate at which 
the deconstruction of the rule of law occurs in Poland and Hungary today demonstrates the 
importance of a constitutional culture beyond black letter law including constitutions, 
institutions, and procedures.  
 
The shift came rather abruptly when, in April 2010, in a free and fair election the centre-
right political parties Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) and the Christian-Democratic 
People’s Party (in Hungarian: Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP)19 got 53% of the votes, 
which translated into more than two-thirds of the seats in the unicameral Hungarian 
Parliament under the election law then in force.20 The ruling party did not tolerate any 
internal dissent, and after forming the second Fidesz government21 it eliminated – at least 
in the domestic setting – all sources of criticism by both the voters and state institutions, 
effectively disposing of any effective checks and balances. Should a discontent electorate 
now wish to correct deficiencies, it would be difficult for it to do so due to the novel rules 
of the national ballot, which fundamentally bring into question the fairness of future 
elections. Judicial oversight and most importantly the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s room 
for correcting the failures of a majoritarian government have been considerably impaired, 
along the powers of other fora designed to serve as checks on government powers. 
Distortions of the media and lack of public information lead to the impossibility of a 
meaningful public debate and weaken the chances of restoring deliberative democracy. 
Support by the electorate is enhanced through emotionalism, revolutionary rhetoric, 
catchphrases such as ‘law and order’, ‘family’, ‘tradition’, ‘nation’, symbolic lawmaking, 
and identity politics in general. The friend/foe dichotomy is artificially created through 
punitive populism and scapegoating, partially through building on pre-existing prejudices, 
                                            
 
 
14 Cf. M. A. Vachudova: Europe Undivided (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
15 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008). 
16 C. Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny’, in C. Hillion (ed) EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach 
(Hart Publishing, 2004) 
17 P.-C. Müller-Graff: ‘Legal Framework for Relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe: General Aspects’, in M. Maresceau (ed), Enlarging the European Union: Relations between the EU and 
Central and Eastern Europe (Longman, 1997) 42; M. Maresceau, ‘The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: A Political and 
Legal Analysis’, in M. Maresceau and E. Lanon (eds), EU Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies (Palgrave, 
2001). 
18 W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and Enlargement of Europe (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
19 The cooperation between Fidesz and KDNP shall not be regarded as a coalition, rather as a party alliance 
created already before the elections. According to their self-perception their relation is similar to the party 
alliance between CDU and CSU in the Federal Republic of Germany. KDNP is a tiny party that would probably not 
get into Parliament on its own. The insignificance of KDNP allows us to abbreviate for the sake of brevity: 
whenever the term ‘Fidesz government’ is used, the Fidesz–KDNP political alliance is meant.  
20 Act C of 1997 on the Election Procedure. 
21 Fidesz first governed between 1998 and 2002. 
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and partially by creating new enemies such as multinational companies or persons 
challenging Hungarian unorthodoxy on the international scene.  
 
The changes can be traced back to the government’s ideological roots. But unlike in Poland, 
ideology by the government is chosen by way of political convenience. Turning towards 
illiberalism was a necessity, for a government wishing to retain political and economic power 
at all costs, and capture the state to this end, cannot reconcile its ideological stance with 
the concept of liberal democracy. So Fidesz had to search for other role models than the 
democratic world, and found its allies in countries such as Turkey, and most importantly 
Russia. Even though illiberalism was relabelled as ‘Christian democracy’ after Fidesz was re-
elected in April 2018, the same form of governance remains. Representing harshly opposing 
views within a short period of time never hurt Fidesz politicians, who are brilliant at 
explaining their reasons for a volte-face. The party, originally with strong anti-Russian 
sentiments, became pro-Putin – and still managed to retain public support. 
 
Poland followed the path of illiberalism when the Law and Justice party (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, PiS) entered government in 2015. The country experienced a very serious 
departure from liberal democratic principles and is going through the reversal of the rule of 
law in various fields.  
 
The tools employed and the outcome are very similar to the ones in Hungary, but certain 
elements of the Polish case also make it distinct, illustrating that there was no Central 
Eastern European or even Visegrád pattern. First, unlike in Hungary, the Polish government 
does not have a constitution-making nor -amending majority, therefore – for the time being 
– it engages in rule of law backsliding by way of curbing ordinary laws; as Ewa Łętowska put 
it, the government has been ‘trying to change the system through the back door’.22 Second, 
Hungary is essentially a kleptocracy,23 where the government may pick any ideology available 
on the political spectrum to acquire and retain economic and political powers. By contrast, 
the Polish government and especially PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, the de facto ruler of 
Poland, are more likely to truly believe in what they are preaching in terms of national 
interests. When justifying rule of law backsliding, a whole new worldview is developed, 
rewriting the democratic transition and the post-1989 Polish history as something 
fundamentally corrupt and poised by foreign interest in contravention to national ones.24 For 
him, post-1989 Polish history, including the roundtable talks in 1989, is the result of an 
                                            
 
 
22 P. Pacula, Poland’s ‘July Coup’ and What is Means for the Judiciary, 19 July 2017, available at: 
http://euobserver.com/justice/138567. Taking the President’s announcement of a 2018 constitutional 
referendum into account, this might change in the future: L. Kelly, Polish President Wants Referendum on 
Constitution in Nov 2018, 24 May 2017, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/poland-politics-president-
constitution-idUSL8N1IQ6P0. For an immediate analysis see M. Matczak, Why the Announced Constitutional 
Referendum in Poland is not a Constitutional Referendum after all, 13 May 2017, available at: 
http://verfassungsblog.de/why-the-announced-constitutional-referendum-in-poland-is-not-a-constitutional-
referendum-after-all/. 
23 Also referred to as a mafia state. See B. Magyar, Post-communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary (CEU Press, 
2016).  
24 J. Conelly, T.T. Koncewicz, Who are Today’s Polish Traitors? Of Politics of Paranoia and Resentment and Missed 
Lessons from the Past, 15 November 2016, available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/who-are-todays-polish-
traitors-of-politics-of-paranoia-and-resentment-and-missed-lessons-from-the-past/. 
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indecent compromise between the individuals and movements bringing about regime change 
and the outgoing Communist forces. Along these lines he sees all democratic institutions as 
a ‘sham’; for him, ‘the Third Republic is not a real state, but a phantom state built on the 
intellectual corruption of political elites, bribery, dysfunctional government caving Brussels 
and selling off Poland to strangers for peanuts.’25 For PiS ‘repolonisation’ means taking over 
power, banks, land, and other property, and means reclaiming Poland from both foreigners 
and the corrupt political elites so as to bring about a true regime change.26 Seemingly all 
means are allowed, and any checks or controls on power are seen as unnecessary burdens 
the state shall be freed from, so as to accomplish this purging exercise.  
 
Illiberal governments are very well aware of the irreconcilability of their politics with 
European values. The states in question therefore lobby for exemptions.  
 
 
a. Invocation of national sovereignty to undermine the institutions 
 
A first technique is the invocation of national sovereignty without any further justification. 
Polish capture of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, the National Council of 
the Judiciary, and ordinary courts happened under the pretext that ‘reform’ of the judiciary 
was a matter for the Member States and the EU acted ultra vires if it interfered. The Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal was the first institution to fall victim to state capture at the end of 
2016.27 Its powers have been considerably cut, changes were introduced to its structure and 
proceedings, budget cuts took place, and three justices elected constitutionally by the 7th 
Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) were not permitted to take oath, whereas 
three justices elected unconstitutionally by the 8th Sejm after PiS had won the elections 
were permitted to do so. After having rendered the Constitutional Tribunal irrelevant in 
upholding the rule of law, the government has done the same with the Supreme Court, the 
National Council for the Judiciary, and ordinary courts. The changes related to the 
reorganisation of the Supreme Court empower the executive to: prematurely end the tenure 
of judges, meaning forcefully retire them; determine the conditions and procedure for 
becoming a Supreme Court judge; control disciplinary procedures, amending the rules of 
procedure of the Supreme Court; change the total number of judges serving on the Supreme 
Court; reorganise the chambers in which Supreme Court justices are to serve; and 
restructure case allocation.28 Ordinary court capture happened by subordinating all 
Presidents and Directors of courts, i.e. persons who decide on administrative and financial 
issues, to the Minister of Justice.29 Even this short enumeration of government intrusions in 
                                            
 
 
25 Id.  
26 Freedom House, Pluralism under Attack: The Assault on Press Freedom in Poland, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/assault-press-freedom-poland#sdendnote21anc. 
27 T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-Defence’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law 
Review 1753. 
28 In disregard of national and international criticism, on 8 December 2017, the laws on the Supreme Court and 
the Council were adopted by the Sejm, and on 15 December 2017 they were approved by the Senate.  
29 Ustawa z dnia 23 marca 2017 r. o zmianie ustawy – Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych [Law amending the 
act on the organization of common courts system], OJ 2017, item 803, available at: 
http://www.dziennikustaw.gov.pl/DU/2017/803 (in Polish).  
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to the powers of the courts which highlights only some of the milestones in judicial capture 
shows, in the words of the Venice Commission – the most authoritative body in Europe on 
the issues of the rule of law and judicial independence – that ‘the constitutionality of Polish 
laws can no longer be guaranteed’.30 Another example from the same jurisdiction is the 
dispute related to the felling of trees in the Białowieża Forest, a UNESCO World Heritage 
Site. In Białowieża, pending the judgment in the main proceedings, the Court of Justice 
ordered Poland to stop the forest management operations.31 The Polish response was an 
intensified logging of trees, and Poland even asked for removing the forest in question from 
the UNESCO World Heritage List.32 Reference to national sovereignty often comes without 
any further justification. As the above controversy shows, by questioning the powers of the 
EU the Polish government does not aim to initiate a legitimate discussion about the 
delineation between national and EU powers. It much rather wishes ‘to break free from the 
supranational machinery of control and enforcement. Following the trajectory from the “exit 
in values” to the “exit in legality” reveals an inescapable logic. All institutions, domestic 
and supranational, are seen to be standing in the way, and their rejection is part of the 
comprehensive constitutional doctrine – the politics of resentment.’33 
 
 
b. Appeals to constitutional identity to undermine the institutions 
 
The second and more sophisticated technique is the attempt to package departures from 
the rule of law in the name of constitutional identity.34 Back in 2017, the Hungarian 
Parliament failed to acquire the necessary quorum to constitutionally entrench the concept 
of constitutional identity, but after the Fidesz and its tiny coalition partner the Christian 
Democratic People's Party acquired a two thirds i.e. constitution amending majority, a 
modification to Article R) of the Fundamental Law referring to ‘Hungarian cultural and 
Christian identity’ has again been tabled. But the amendment is somewhat redundant, since 
the already captured Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: HCC) came to rescue the 
government, and developed its own theory of constitutional identity after the failed attempt 
to embed the concept into the Fundamental Law. When delivering its abstract constitutional 
interpretation in relation to European Council decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 
establishing provisional measures benefitting Italy and Greece, to support them in better 
coping with an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third 
countries in those Member States, the HCC invoked constitutional identity.35 However 
tautological this may sound, according to the HCC ‘constitutional identity equals the 
                                            
 
 
30 European Commission, ‘Recommendation of 26.7.2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland’ [2017] C(2017)5320, 
para. 10. 
31 Case C–441/17R Commission v Poland [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:877. 
32 In Case C–441/17 Commission v Poland [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:255, of 18 April 2018, the Court ruled that by 
carrying on with the logging in the Białowieża Forest, Poland failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law. 
33 T.T. Koncewicz, The Białowieża case. A Tragedy in Six Acts, Verfassungsblog, 17 May 2018, available at: 
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-bialowieza-case-a-tragedy-in-six-acts/.  
34 G. Halmai, ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article 
E) (2) of the Fundamental Law’ (2018) 43 Review of Central and East European Law 1, 23–42. 
35 22/2016 (XII. 5.) HCC decision. 
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constitutional (self-)identity of Hungary’.36 Its content is to be determined by the HCC on a 
case-by-case basis based on the interpretation of the Fundamental Law, its purposes, the 
National Avowal contained therein, and the achievements of the Hungarian historical 
constitution. This definition is so vague that it can be considered as an attempt of granting 
a carte blanche type of derogation to the executive and the legislative from Hungary’s 
obligations under EU law.37 Once Fidesz acquired a two thirds majority again in the 2018 
parliamentary elections, it finally incorporated the constitutional identity to the 
Fundamental Law by way of the so-called seventh constitutional amendment.38 Questioning 
claims of constitutional identity might well be criticised by those concerned as being 
ignorant or lacking respect, but European supervisory mechanisms should be well-suited and 
confident enough to tell the bluff apart from genuine claims of constitutional identity.39 
 
 
c. Invocation of national security to undermine the institutions 
 
The third technique is reference to national security. Labelling virtually anyone still capable 
of formulating dissent as foreign agents is a technique long used, but in Hungary it was taken 
to a whole new level in 2017 with the adoption of Lex CEU and Lex NGO,40 targeting a private 
university and foreign-funded civil society organisations that are independent of government 
funds and thereby fit to express government criticism. The explanations of the laws 
attempting to force CEU out of the country and to limit public space for NGOs respectively 
attempt to delegitimise these entities by claiming they pose national security threats to the 
country. The phenomenon of a shrinking space for civil society can be traced in both Hungary 
and Poland. The narrative surrounding NGOs got very hostile. We are witnessing orchestrated 
smear campaigns against civil society members that are criticising the government or simply 
not fitting its ideological agenda.41 In some cases, the smear campaigns are followed by 




37 For English language analyses see G. Halmai, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity, 
10 January 2017, available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-and-constitutional-
identity/. 
38 See inserted Article R) Fundamental Law. The official government position is available at: 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-justice/news/the-chief-goal-of-the-seventh-amendment-to-the-
constitution-is-the-protection-of-national-sovereignty. 
39 R.D. Kelemen, ‘The Dangers of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M. Avbelj and G. Davies (eds), Research Handbook 
on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2018); V. Perju, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Human Rights in European 
Constitutionalism’, in S. Vöneky and G. L. Neuman (eds), Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in a World 
in Disorder (Cambridge University Press, 2018); G. Halmai, Abuse of Constitutional Identity, op. cit. 
40 Act XXV of 2017 on the Modifications of Act CCIV of 20011 on National Higher Education and Act LXXVI of 2017 
on the transparency of foreign-funded organisations. According to the law on NGOs, any association or foundation 
receiving foreign support above the amount of 23.200 EUR per year will have to notify the courts about this fact. 
EU money is exempted, but only if distributed by the Hungarian state through a budgetary institution. The 
respective organisation will be labelled as a so-called ‘organization supported from abroad’, which will need to 
be indicated at the entity’s website, press releases, publications, etc. The law is disturbing in many aspects: it 
mimics Russian worst practices, which have been condemned by international organisations as violations of 
freedom of association and free speech. 
41 Associated Press in Warsaw, Police Raid Offices of Women's Groups in Poland After Protests, 5 October 2017, 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/05/police-raid-offices-of-womens-groups-in-
poland.  
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investigations undertaken by law enforcement or tax authorities, which may create an even 
more hostile environment for NGOs.42 Governments deprive civil society of effective 
functioning by limiting their access to funding, including state but also foreign funding, as 
the Hungarian law obliges NGOs to indicate that they are ‘organisations receiving support 
from abroad’, and to display this stigmatising label on all their materials published.43 This is 
getting very close to demonising dissenters as terrorists and indeed the government claims 
that NGOs receiving foreign support – i.e. the most professional ones – are helping asylum 
seekers, and among them terrorists, enter the country. A modification of the Hungarian 
Criminal Code ensures that criminal sanctions can be imposed on NGOs and individuals that 
provide legal or other types of aid to migrants arriving at to the Hungarian borders.44 National 
security claims might not only fit into the ruling party’s nationalistic, exclusionary rhetoric 
and scapegoating, but it can serve (i.e. be abused) as the basis for lobbying for exemptions 
from European standards. As Uitz points out, reference to national security, which is the 
sole responsibility of the Member States according to Article 4(2) TEU ‘can be a much 
stronger centrifugal force in Europe than cries of constitutional identity could ever be. … 
Therefore, it is all the more important that European constitutional and political actors 
realize: The carefully crafted new Hungarian laws use the cloak of national security to stab 
the rule of law, as understood in Europe, in the heart.’45 
 
 
d. Disinformation campaigns at the service of the backsliding regimes 
 
The fourth technique the autocrats use to undermine the rule of law is disinformation or 
misinterpretation of the laws and policies of the government. Again Hungary took the lead 
in 2011 when they sent a wrong translation to Brussels of their controversial new 
Constitution, the Fundamental Law, which looked more in conformity with EU laws and 
                                            
 
 
42 Hungarian Helsinki Committee et al., ‘Timeline of Governmental Attacks Against Hungarian NGO Sphere’, 7 
April 2017, available at: 
https://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/timeline_of_gov_attacks_against_hu_ngos_07042017.pdf. 
43 For more details see M. Szuleka, ‘First Victims or Last Guardians? The Consequences of Rule of Law Backsliding 
for NGOs: Case Studies of Hungary and Poland’ (2018) CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 2018-06. 
44 Article 353/ of Act C of 2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code. For the official government position see: Website 
of the Hungarian Government, Strong Action is Required Against the Organisers of Migration, 24 May 2018, 
available at: http://www.kormany.hu/en/news/strong-action-is-required-against-the-organisers-of-migration.  
45 R. Uitz, The Return of the Sovereign: A Look at the Rule of Law in Hungary – and in Europe, 5 April 2017, 
available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/the-return-of-the-sovereign-a-look-at-the-rule-of-law-in-hungary-and-
in-europe/. 




www.reconnect-europe.eu  Page 14 of 28 
 
values than the actual text.46 From a more substantive view, the Polish47 and Hungarian48 
responses to the Commission49 and the European Parliament50 invitation for a Council 
Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland and Hungary of 
values enshrined in Article 2 TEU also contain factual mistakes and deliberate deceit.51 Up-
to-date information following the fast legislative changes that sometimes happen literally 
overnight and solid legal research may deconstruct the fake information these texts contain 
and challenge the contention that these political forces engage in a dialogue, when all they 
do is produce documents or make some cosmetic changes in order to gain time and press on 
with their illiberal agenda.  
 
Such ‘anti-Member States’ that abuse the law and Constitution to create autocracies take 
full part in governing the Union, benefit from unprecedented direct financial support, and 
abuse the international prestige which is associated with the membership of this 
organisation.52 Poland will have received 86 billion euros under the current budgetary 
framework by 2020 and Hungary 24 billion, which is an unprecedented transfer of resources 
from democracies to illiberal regimes, which unquestionably contributes to the 
entrenchment of the regimes in power. 
                                            
 
 
46 For a detailed enumeration of the discrepancies see a joint document by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 
the Eötvös Károly Policy Institute, and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Full List of Mistakes and Omissions of 
the English Version of the Hungarian Draft-Constitution, available at: 
https://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/list_of_all_the_omissions_and_mistranslations.pdf. This technique is also 
employed the other way round: when the Venice Commission delivered its highly critical opinion of the 
Fundamental Law, it was interpreted by the Government, as if the Hungarian constitution was being praised. 
See, The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, NGOs Analyze Government Reactions Concerning the Venice 
Commission's Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary, 18 July 2011, available at: 
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/ngos-analyze-government-reactions-concerning-the-venice-commissions-opinion-
on-the-new-constitution-of-hungary/. 
47 See: Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary, 7 March 2018, 
available at: https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/white_paper_en_full.pdf.  
48 See, as made public by MEP Ujhelyi, ‘Information Sheet of the Hungarian Government on the Issues Raised by 
the Draft Report of Judith Sargentini on ‘A Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) 
of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on 
which the Union is Founded’, 2018, available at http://ujhelyi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Information-
sheet-of-the-Hungarian-Government-on-the-issues-raised-by-th....pdf. 
49 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach 
by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law’ [2017] COM(2017) 835 final. 
50 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘Draft report on a Proposal Calling on the Council to 
Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious 
Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union is Founded [2017] (2017/2131(INL)), Rapporteur: Judith 
Sargentini). 
51 For an assessment of the Polish White Paper by the Polish Judges Association ‘Iustitia’, together with a team 
of experts, see, Response to the White Paper Compendium on the Reforms of the Polish Justice System, Presented 
by the Government of the Republic of Poland to the European Commission, 2018, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/mar/pl-judges-association-response-judiciary-reform-3-18.pdf. For an 
assessment of the Hungarian information sheet see the lengthy criticism by R. Labanino and Z. Nagy, The Social 
and Political Situation in Hungary, 17 May 2018 available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OcIlFUtg9s1-
FLMRo_qF4MbywRxAAbt5/view.  
52 C. Closa, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing the 
Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 13.  
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The international reactions to the current situation underline one thing: the Union is either 
content with the current situation or entirely powerless. The former is hardly convincing 
given both the size of direct economic transfers to Hungary and Poland as well as the dangers 
that these Member States bring into the Union, as fully expressed in the numerous public 
statements of the members of the College of Commissioners and heard during European 
Parliament debates. If a Member State breaches the EU’s fundamental values, this is likely 
to undermine the very foundations of the Union and the trust between its Member States, 
regardless of the field in which the breach occurs.53 Beyond harming the nationals of a 
Member State, Union citizens residing in that state will also be detrimentally affected. 
Moreover, the lack of limitations on ‘illiberal practices’54 may encourage other Member 
States’ governments to follow suit and subject other countries’ citizens to an abuse of their 
rights. In other words, violations of the rule of law may, if there are no consequences, 
become contagious.55 Finally, all EU citizens will to some extent suffer due to the given 
state’s participation in the EU’s decision-making mechanisms. At the very least, the 
legitimacy of the Union’s decision-making process will be jeopardised. Therefore, the latter 
explanation, i.e. the EU’s powerlessness, seems to be the core of the matter. Such 
powerlessness is a consequence of a combination of the real difficulties, conceptual as well 
as practical, related to the enforcement of EU values,56 but also, equally importantly, to the 
systematic misrepresentation of the Union’s capacity by the Member States and the 
institutions unwilling to act, as a clear consensus on forceful dealing with the rule of law 
backsliding is apparently lacking. 
 
The claims that little to nothing can be done under the current legal framework – which are 
heard with remarkable regularity, confirming the second supposition above – are entirely 
baseless, as Hillion, Besselink, and other scholars have consistently pointed out.57 In making 
such claims, the Commission and other institutions point to the fact that this powerlessness 
is not caused by an absolute lack of Treaty instruments that would warrant intervention. 
Rather, the instruments that are available are apparently considered too strong, or, to put 
it differently, too toxic, to be used. Among possible instruments, the EU’s ‘nuclear’ option 
stands out, we are told: Article 7 TEU could not be activated for a long time in fear that the 
fallout would have been too terrible and because the hurdles for starting the procedure were 
allegedly too insurmountable. Such justifications for inaction or engaging in substitute 
                                            
 
 
53 European Commission Communication, ‘On Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – Respect for and 
Promotion of the Values on which the Union is Based’ [2003] COM(2003)606 final, p. 5. 
54 The term ‘illiberal democracy’ was coined long ago, but it gained practical relevance in the EU after Hungarian 
Prime Minister praised the concept in his speech given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 2014. Cf. Frans Timmermans’ 
speech to the European Parliament: ‘There is no such thing as an illiberal democracy’. F. Timmermans, EU 
Framework for Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4402_en.htm. 
55 S.a., Politico, Viktor Orbán: The Conservative Subversive, Politico 28, 2015, 12–15, 15. 
56 Cf. G. Itzcovich, ‘On the Legal Enforcement of Values. The Importance of the Institutional Context’, in A. 
Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.; M. Avbelj, ‘Pluralism and Systemic 
Defiance in the EU’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.  
57 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov 
(eds), Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight, op. cit; L. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 
TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, 
op. cit. 
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activity, like the invention of the new soft-law procedures, are difficult to reconcile with 
the radical deterioration of constitutionalism on the ground in the backsliding states.58 Now 
that the Article 7(1) TEU procedure has been triggered against Poland,59 and there are 
serious attempts to have it initiated against Hungary,60 the opposite preoccupation comes to 
the fore, namely the inefficiency of the tool,61 which leads to the reinvention of other tools 
in place. For instance, Article 258 TFEU or 259 TFEU has been given a broader appeal in the 
backsliding context,62 as evidenced by the infringement proceedings pursued against Poland 
in the context of its destruction of the Supreme Court, which build on the newly-found effet 
utile and EU law scope-shaping significance of Article 19(1) TEU (as well as Article 47 CFR, 
read in conjunction with the former),63 in opposition to the Pyrrhic victories in the otherwise 
similar Hungarian context.64 Scholars expected this development,65 which infuses Article 258 
TFEU with clear new potential, all the necessary caution in interpreting it too broadly 
notwithstanding. 
 
Some, like Vice President Timmermans, compare the present situation to that of the Austrian 
crisis at the turn of the millennium and fear that triggering Article 7 would similarly 
backfire.66 The parallel drawn between the Austrian and current situations is misleading, 
however, for numerous reasons. The most obvious point is that the institutions could not 
have made use of the then non-existent preventive arm of Article 7 – currently Article 7(1) 
TEU – at the time the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) entered government, and there 
was no reason to make use of the provision as it then stood, i.e. to invoke the sanctioning 
arm.67 Given the lack of a legally pre-defined preventive procedure, a political action was 
opted for that need not – but, very importantly, could – be taken vis-à-vis Hungary or Poland 
in light of Article 7. The political quarantine vis-à-vis Austria started right after the 
formation of the government, before those in power could have eroded European values, 
                                            
 
 
58 D. Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’ (2017) EUI Working Paper LAW 
2017/10. 
59 European Commission, ‘Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland – Proposal for a Council Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a 
Serious Breach by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law’ [2017] (COM(2017) 835 final. 
60 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, (2017/2131 (INL)), op. cit.  
61 As a consequence, the institutions see the solution in the power of the purse to provide disincentives for rule 
of law violations. See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of the Union's Budget in Case of Generalised Deficiencies as Regards the Rule of Law 
in the Member States’ [2018] COM(2018)324 final. 
62 K. L. Scheppele, ‘The Case for Systemic Infringement Actions’, in Closa and Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule 
of Law, op. cit.; D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU 
to Make it a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law, 153. 
63 Case C–64/16 Associação sindical dos juízes portugueses [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:117; M. Krajewski, ‘Associação 
sindical dos juízes portugueses: The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma’ (2018) 3 European Papers 295. 
64 Case C–286/12 Commission v Hungary [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:687 (compulsory retirement of judges). U. 
Belavusau, ‘Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1145. 
65 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’ op. cit. 
66 F. Timmermans, The European Union and the Rule of Law – Keynote Speech at Conference on the Rule of Law, 
Tilburg University, 31 August 2015, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/timmermans/announcements/european-union-and-rule-law-keynote-speech-conference-rule-law-tilburg-
university-31-august-2015_en.  
67 K. Lachmayer, ‘Questioning the Basic Values – Austria and Jörg Haider’, in Jakab and Kochenov (eds), The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.  
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and once the situation was thoroughly investigated, the Three Wise Men commissioned with 
this task did not find a violation of EU values, and accordingly suggested lifting the political 
sanctions.68 EU Member States’ hostile intervention against Austria was not backed by either 
a proper legal basis or political necessity: an illegal ad hoc action triggered by a democratic 
election result. The current Hungarian and Polish situations cannot be compared to the 
former Austrian one, since the former are long in the state of constitutional capture, which 
is well documented both by European institutions and in the academic literature.  
 
 
2. The place of values in the system of EU law 
 
Article 2 TEU, which makes reference to democracy, the rule of law, and a series of other 
(interrelated) values of the Union, is somewhat different in nature from the rest of the 
acquis. The same unquestionably applies to the violations of values: Article 2 TEU violations 
are not the same as ordinary acquis violations. Such differences are particularly acute in the 
context of one specific type of chronically non-compliant states, where, like in Hungary, 
non-compliance is ideological and cannot be explained by reference to the lacking capacity, 
‘simple’ corruption, and outright sloppiness69 – arguments one might deploy in the context 
of some South-East European countries.70 Where chronic non-compliance is ideological, 
Article 260 TFEU becomes the crux of the whole story, as simple restatements of the breach 
under Article 258 TFEU (or Article 259 TFEU, for that matter)71 will presumably not be 
enough,72 even if the recent innovations mentioned in the previous section would probably 
allow for hope even in the context of the most cautious reading of the potential of these 
provisions.73 The question of the effectiveness of the ideological choice favouring non-
compliance made by the relevant Member States will remain open for the years to come, as 
the Court in consort with other institutions is in search of a more effective means of 
deploying the current instruments in the context of rule of law backsliding. 
 
                                            
 
 
68 M. Ahtisaari, J. Frowein and M. Oreja, ‘Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common 
European Values, in Particular Concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees and Immigrants, and the Evolution 
of the Political Nature of the FPÖ’ (2001) 40 International Legal Materials: Current Documents 1, 102–123, (The 
Wise Men Report). 
69 R. Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When an Illiberal Democracy is in the Making? An Appeal to Comparative Constitutional 
Scholarship from Hungary’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 279. 
70 E.g. M. Ioannidis, ‘The Greek Case’, in Jakab and Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law, op. cit. 
71 See e.g., D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make 
it a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 153. 
72 On the main deficiencies of the system, see, most importantly, B. Jack, ‘Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective 
Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal, 19 (2013) 420; P. 
Wennerås, ‘Sanctions Against Member States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, but not Kicking?’ (2012) 49 Common 
Market Law Review 145; P. Wennerås, ‘Making Effective Use of Article 260 TFEU’, in Jakab and Kochenov (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit. 
73 E.g. L.W. Gormley, ‘Infringement Proceedings’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU 
Law and Values (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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While the literature has focused on restating the EU’s presumed rule of law nature,74 as well 
as the issue of the enforcement of EU rule of law and other values in the defiant Member 
States,75 it is crucial to realise that Europe’s structural constitutional vulnerability stretches 
far beyond enforcement issues per se. Instead, it is rooted in the discrepancies between the 
EU’s proclaimed constitutional structure as we find it in the Treaties and the reality marking 
the development of EU integration, as outlined above, fostering doubt as to whether the 
Union is actually abiding by the rule of law.76 In the light of this structural deficiency, one 
can argue that the much-analysed systemic deficiency77 in the area of values and especially 
the rule of law was bound to emerge sooner or later, whether in Hungary, Poland or 
elsewhere, as the Union matured.78 Dealing with it will necessarily require moving beyond 
preoccupation with enforcement, which has engulfed all the recent literature on the subject 
– quite understandably, given the astonishing speed of the constitutional deterioration in 
both Hungary and Poland – and reforming the integration project at the core,79 ensuring that 
democracy and the rule of law are endowed with a more important role to play in the context 
of the supranational law of the Union. 
 
In this general context where the acquis and values are not synonymous, the application of 
the Copenhagen criteria in the context of the recent enlargement rounds particularly 
teaches a lesson of caution: the Commission has emerged as an institution that, when given 
all the responsibility regarding the preparedness of the new Member States for accession 
(values compliance outside the scope of the acquis included) failed the exercise.80 Here, to 
the void of substance the lack of the capability to generate such a substance was also added, 
the lack of virtually any limitations emerging from the scope of the law notwithstanding. 
Besides illustrating the EU’s built-in limitations with regard to its ability to generate the 
substance of Article 2 TEU rules, the pre-accession context also sounds the alarm bell on 
institutional capacity: the Commission is probably not the best actor to entrust with the 
internal monitoring of Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU.  
                                            
 
 
74 M. L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999); L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle’; W. Schröder (ed), Strengthening the Rule of Law 
in Europe: From a Common Concept to Mechanisms of Implementation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). 
75 E.g., the contributions in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. cit.; A. Jakab and D. 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, op. cit.; A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), 
Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015); J.-W. Müller, 
‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ (2013) Transatlantic Academy 
Working Paper No. 3. 
76 G. Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and its Core’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009); G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats 
in a Two-Level System’, in Closa and Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. cit.; D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law 
Without the Rule of Law. Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’ (2015) 34 Yearbook of European Law. 
77 A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What it is, What Has Been Done, 
What Can Be Done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59. 
78 See, for a broad discussion, D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2015). 
79 For a much more critical restatement of this particular argument, see, D. Kochenov, ‘Is There EU Rule of Law?’, 
in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. cit.; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Living in a Glass 
House: Europe, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law, op. 
cit. 
80 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, op. cit. 
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3. How to approach the rule of law in the current context? 
 
The essence of the rule of law, distinguishing it from legality, democracy, and other 
wonderful things, is that the law is constantly in tension with and controlled by law – how 
the EU is falling short of such institutional ideal will be demonstrated. Palombella’s rule of 
law, which is dialogical in essence since it presupposes and constantly relies upon a constant 
taming of law with law, ‘amounts to preventing one dominant source of law and its 
unconstrained whim, from absorbing all the available normativity’.81 On this count the rule 
of law implies that the law – gubernaculum – should always be controlled by law – jurisdictio 
– lying outwith the sovereign’s reach.82 The tension is necessarily dialogical in nature since 
the absolute domination of either gubernaculum or jurisdictio necessarily destroys the core 
of the rule of law, which is the tension between the two. It goes without saying that making 
use of such a definition should necessarily be qualified by the wise words of Krygier: 
‘whatever one might propose as the echt meaning of the rule of law is precisely that: a 
proposal’.83 The rule of law is a classic example of an essentially contested concept:84 the 
EU is seemingly as hopeless at defining what it means as its Member States and the broad 
academic doctrine.85 The debate is constantly ongoing,86 but the last available definition,87 
inspired by the Venice Commission’s guidelines,88 could provide a solid illustration of the 
current state of the definitional debate. Whether one agrees with the Commission’s 
approach or not, it seems to be beyond any doubt what the rule of law is not. It is not 
democracy, the protection of human rights, nor similar wonderful things, each of them 
                                            
 
 
81 G. Palombella, ‘The Principled, and Winding, Road to Al-Dulimi. Interpreting the Interpreters’ (2014) 1 
Questions of International Law 17, 18. Similarly, see, D. Georgiev, ‘Politics of Rule of Law: Deconstruction and 
Legitimacy in International Law’ (1993) 4 EJIL 1, 4. 
82 For an analysis of this perspective, see, id.; G. Palombella, È possibile la legalità globale? (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2012); G. Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and its Core’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule 
of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 17. See also, G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy, op. 
cit. 
83 M. Krygier, ‘Inside the Rule of Law’ (2014) 3 Rivista di filosofia del diritto 77, at 78. 
84 For a brilliant outline of the history of contestation, see, J. Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 127.  
85 For a multi-disciplinary overview see e.g., G.K. Hadfield and B. R. Weingast, ‘Microfoundations of the Rule of 
Law’ (2014) 17 Annual Review of Political Science 21; L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of 
the European Union’ (2009) Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 04/09 (NYU Law School), and the literature cited 
therein. See also L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’, op. cit., on the ‘holistic understanding’ of the 
rule of law. For a special ‘Eastern-European’ perspective, which is particularly important in the context of the 
on-going developments in the EU, see, J. Přibáň, ‘From “Which Rule of Law?” to “The Rule of Which Law?”: Post-
Communist Experiences of European Legal Integration’ (2009) 1 The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 337. 
86 For key contributions, see, W. Schröder (2015), op. cit.; L. Morlino and G. Palombella (eds), Rule of Law and 
Democracy (Boston: Brill, 2010); G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009). 
87 Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ COM (2014) 158. 
88 Venice Commission Document CDL-AD(2016)007-e ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ (adopted in 106th Plenary Session, 
Venice, 11–12 March 2016), as well as in the earlier version thereof: Venice Commission Document CDL-
AD(2011)003rev-e ‘Report on the Rule of Law’ (adopted in 86th Plenary Session, Venice, 25–26 March 2011). 
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definitely boasting its own sound claim to existence as a notion independent from the rule 
of law.89 And it is not mere legality, which is adherence to the law. 
 
Once the rule of law and legality are distinguished, the basic meaning of the rule of law 
comes down to the idea of the subordination of the law to another kind of law, which is not 
up to the sovereign to change at will.90 This idea, traceable back to mediaeval England,91 is 
described with recourse to two key notions in order to reflect the fundamental duality of 
the law’s fabric, indispensable for the operation of the rule of law as a principle of law:92 
jurisdictio – the law untouchable for the day-to-day rules running the legal system and 
removed from the ambit of the purview of the sovereign – and gubernaculum, which is the 
use of the general rule-making power.93 As Krygier put it in his commentary on Palombella’s 
work, ‘the king was subject to the law that he had not made, indeed that made him king. 
For the king – for anyone – to ignore or override that law was to violate the rule of law’.94 
Even in the contemporary age of popular sovereignty, this statement is obviously true, since 
democracy should not be capable of annihilating the law. Indeed, this is one of the key points 
made by the defenders of judicial review.95 
 
Unlike despotic or totalitarian regimes, where the ruler is free to do anything he pleases, or 
problematic EU Member States such as Hungary, where the constitution is a political tool, or 
Poland, where the executive ignores the constitution to undermine the separation of powers, 
or pre-constitutional democracies, which equate the law with legislation,96 the majority of 
constitutional democracies in the world today recognise the distinction between jurisdictio 
and gubernaculum, thus achieving a sound approximation of Palombella’s rule of law as an 
institutional ideal, in terms of maintaining and fostering the constant tension between these 
two facets of the law. The authority should be itself bound by clear legal norms which are 
outside of its control. Indeed, this is the key feature of post-war constitutionalism. The 
jurisdictio–gubernaculum distinction, lying at the core of what the rule of law is about, can 
be policed either by courts or even by the structure of the constitution itself through 
removing certain domains from gubernaculum’s scope.97 The ideology of human rights is of 
                                            
 
 
89 One should not forget the wise words of Joseph Raz: ‘We have no need to be converted into the rule of law 
just in order to believe … that good should triumph’: J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’, in J. Raz, The 
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 210. 
90 G. Palombella (2015) ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’, op. cit. 
91 J.P. Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries (DeKald: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2004). 
92 G. Palombella (2012) Legalità globale?, op. cit. 
93 For a detailed exposé, see G. Palombella (2015) ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’, op. cit. See also G. 
Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and its Core’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 17, at 30, emphasising that this duality should not be disturbed by democratic 
outcomes and ethical choices. 
94 M. Krygier, ‘Inside the Rule of Law’ (2014) 3 Rivista di filosofia del diritto 77, 84. 
95 Cf. M. Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation’, op. cit. 
96 In a pre-constitutional state, the Rechtsstaat shapes a reality, in the words of Gianfranco Poggi, where ‘there 
is a relation of near-identity between the state and its law’: G. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A 
Sociological Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978) 238 (as cited in M. Krygier, ‘Inside the Rule 
of Law’, op. cit., at 84). 
97 Y. Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 179–196. 
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huge significance in this context.98 Furthermore, the existence of international law and, 99 
of course, supranational legal orders,100 definitely contributes to the policing of the 
aforementioned duality.101 The policing of the jurisdictio–gubernaculum divide is thus 
possible both through the means internal and external to the given legal system. 
 
 
4. Supranational law and the instrumentalisation of values 
 
From Lord Mackenzie Stuart102 to Les Verts, which characterises the Treaties as ‘a 
constitutional charter based on the rule of law’,103 what we have been hearing about on the 
subject of the rule of law in the EU actually amounts to compliance with own law.104 This is 
an established understanding of legality.105 Legality is not enough to ensure that the EU 
behaves like – and is – a true rule of law-based constitutional system. Should one submit that 
equating the rule of law and legality is a legitimate move, then, as Palombella correctly 
notes, our thinking ‘shifts the issue from the rule of law to the […] respect for the laws of a 
legal system’.106 Yet ‘the rule of law cannot mean just the self-referentiality of a legal 
order’,107 which is the reason why contemporary constitutionalism is usually understood as 
                                            
 
 
98 G. Frankenberg, ‘Human Rights and the Belief in a Just World’ (2013) 12 I-CON 35. 
99 R. Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy of International Law’ (2013) 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 2. 
100 For an argument that numerous Central and Easters European states were actually motivated by the desire 
for external legal checks on their laws – a jurisdictio – when joining the Council of Europe, see, W. Sadurski, 
Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
101 Palombella (2012) Legalità globale?, op. cit., ch. 2. 
102 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities and the Rule of Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1977). 
See also G. Bebr, Rule of Law within the European Communities (Brussels: Institut d’Etudes Européennes de 
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Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn) (Oxford/Munich: Hart Publishing/CH Beck, 2010) 763, 772–
779. EU institutions’ own accounts of what is meant by the rule of law beyond the tautology of ‘being bound by 
law’ present a most diverse account, which found an expression in the EU’s external action: L. Pech, ‘Promoting 
the Rule of Law Abroad’, in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the 
International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 108. 
105 E.g. the contributions in L.F.M. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of Legality in the 
European Union (The Hague: Kluwer, 2010). 
106 G. Palombella (2015) ‘Beyond Legality – Before Democracy’, op. cit. 
107 Id. Compare with M. Krygier: ‘To try to capture this elusive phenomenon by focusing on characteristics of laws 
and legal institutions is, I believe, to start in the wrong place and move in the wrong direction’: M. Krygier, ‘The 
Rule of Law. An Abuser’s Guide’, in A. Sajó (ed), The Dark Side of Fundamental Rights (Utrecht: Eleven, 2006) 
129. See also B. Tamanaha, Law and Means to an End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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implying, among other things, additional restraints through law:108 restraints which are, 
crucially, not simply democratic or political.109 
 
By and large, the rearticulation of the Union from an ordinary treaty organisation into a 
constitutional system was not accompanied by a sufficient upgrade of the role played by the 
core values it is said to build upon.110 These values do not inform the day-to-day functioning 
of EU law, neither internally111 nor externally.112 Let us not forget that the promotion of its 
values, including the rule of law, is an obligation lying on the Union in accordance with the 
Treaties.113 Indeed, unless we take the Commission’s scribbles for granted, the EU’s steering 
of countless issues directly related to the values at hand is more problematic than not. The 
EU is not about the values Article 2 TEU preaches, which any student of EU law and politics 
will readily confirm.114 The EU’s very self-definition is not about human rights, the rule of 
law or democracy.115 EU law functions differently: there is a whole other set of principles 
that actually matter and are held dear: supremacy, direct effect, and autonomy are the key 
trio coming to mind.116 Operating together, they can set aside both national constitutional117 
                                            
 
 
108 For a clear discussion of the relationship between constitutionalism and the rule of law, see, M. Krygier, 
‘Tempering Power: Realist-idealism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law’, in M. Adams et al. (eds), 
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017) 34–59. 
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depoliticisation of the law has been one of the key criticisms of the EU legal order: J. Přibáň, ‘The Evolving Idea 
of Political Justice in the EU: From Substantive Deficits to the Systemic Contingency of European Society’, in D. 
Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 193 and 
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Studies 549. 
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112 For critical engagements, see, M. Cremona, ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’, in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds), 
Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2011), 275; P. Leino and R. Petrov, ‘Between “Common Values” and Competing Universals’ 
(2009) 15 European Law Journal 654. 
113 Art. 3(5) TEU.  
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Values Seriously’, op. cit. See, also, J.H.H. Weiler’s unpublished paper ‘Europe Against Itself: On the Distinction 
between Values and Virtues (and Vices) in the Construction and Development of European Integration’ (2010) 
Integration Paper for the International Legal Theory Colloquium. 
115 See, most recently, Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 170, which states 
that the fundamental right in the EU are ‘interpret[ed] [...] within the framework of the structure and objectives 
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and international human rights,118 as well as UN law constraints.119 In the current crisis-rich 
environment,120 the Union frequently stars as part of the problem, rather than part of the 
solution. The problem is, it behaves like a constitutional system endowed with authority 
relying on the ECJ to police this claim – a natural expectation of any legal order121 – while 
failing, at the same time, to boast the necessary ABC of constitutionalism: when push comes 
to shove, its values play a foundational role in outlining neither the scope nor the substance 
of the law.122 
 
Bringing the values back in is indispensable in order to infuse the EU’s constitutional claims 
with credibility. In practice, this would mean a return to the promise of EU integration made 
in the days of the Union’s inception.123 A fédération européenne (the one mentioned in the 
Schuman Declaration) to be brought about via the creation of the internal market, stood for 
a line of developments significantly more far-reaching than the idea of economic integration 
as such. The former is value-based – while the latter is probably not (at least, not based on 
the values of Article 2), as Andrew Williams explained in his seminal work.124 
 
Not the whole story was negative, though. Although, the Union’s ambition has gradually been 
scaled down to the market – call it a hijacking of the ends by the means125 – the Union started 
de facto playing, mostly through negative integration, the role of the promoter of liberal 
and tolerant nationhood, as rightly characterised by Kymlicka – advancing a very clear idea 
of constitutionalism based on proportionality, tolerance, and the taming of nationalism.126 
Besides, at the core of the Union there lay basic mutual respect among the Member States: 
the Union would be impossible should they obstruct the principle of mutual recognition.127 
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This came down to frowning upon the ideology of ‘thick’ national identities, however 
glorified in some schoolbooks. The ultimate result is that the EU, sub-consciously as it were, 
emerged as a promoter of one particular type of constitutionalism,128 which is based on the 
rule of law understood through national democracy and the culture of justification implying 
human rights protection and strong judicial review. To be a Member State of the EU in the 
context of these developments came to signify one thing: to stick to this particular type of 
constitutionalism, which is now reflected in Article 2 TEU and which also represents the most 
important condition to be fulfilled before joining the EU, as hinted at in Article 49 TEU.129  
 
The EU thus emerged as a vehicle of the negative market-based approach to the ‘values’ 
question. Clearly, creating a market and questioning the state is not sufficient as a basis for 
a mature constitutional system, potentially creating a justice nugatory at the supranational 
level130 – and perpetuating the Union’s inability to help the Member States labouring hard to 
inflict a justice void on themselves, either through an outright embrace of Putin-style 
‘illiberal democracy’, recently proclaimed as an ideal to strive for by the Hungarian Prime 
Minister Orbán,131 an attack on the judiciary and the media, as in contemporary Poland,132 
or through failing to build a well-ordered and functioning modern state, as it the case in 
Greece133 and Romania,134 for instance. Outright defiance is thus not required to fall out of 
adherence to Article 2 TEU aspirations.  
 
 
5. Supranational powerlessness as an element of Member 
State-level Belarusisation 
 
The Union is thus generally powerless concerning the enforcement of values and, more 
importantly, is also indecisive as to their content. The very fact that we are now concerned 
with enforcing them seriously amounts to nothing else but a concession that the presumption 
that there is a level playing field amongst all Member States in terms of the rule of law etc. 
– i.e. the fact that all of them actually adhere to the specific type of constitutionalism the 
EU set out to promote – does not hold (any more). This is something the European Court of 
Human Rights has already clearly hinted at in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.135 
Acknowledging this alongside the EU’s obvious powerlessness as far as values are concerned 
is a potentially explosive combination in the Union built on Member State equality and the 
principle of mutual recognition. In a situation where the core values are not respected by 
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Hungary, for instance, we are not dealing with a Member State that is revolting for one 
reason or another against a binding norm of European law. At the level of values, we are 
dealing with a principally different Member State, with the Belarusisation of the EU from 
the inside.136 
 
Once the values of Article 2 EU are not observed, the essential presumptions behind the core 
of the Union do not hold any more, undermining the very essence of the integration exercise: 
mutual recognition becomes an untenable fiction, which the Member States are nevertheless 
bound by EU law to adhere to. This is the core of what the autonomy of EU law stands for, 
as confirmed by the Court in the infamous Opinion 2/13 vetoing EU accession to the ECHR.137 
In this Opinion on the draft accession agreement of the EU to ECHR, the Court of Justice 
highlighted the principle of mutual trust between Member States, which forms the 
cornerstone of the area of freedom, security and justice. In the Court of Justice’s 
interpretation, this means that a Member State shall presume all other Member States to be 
in compliance with EU law, including the respect for fundamental rights. To be fair, it should 
be mentioned that the Court also referred to so-called ‘exceptional circumstances’, which 
would warrant deviations from the mutual trust principle,138 but the exact nature of these 
exceptional circumstances was left open.139 So as a general rule, the Court insists that 
autonomy considerations in the context of EU law are usually prone to prevail over human 
rights and other values – including the rule of law – cherished in the national constitutional 
systems of the Member States. Indeed, it would probably not be incorrect to argue that this 
would be the shortest possible summary of Opinion 2/13, which summarised EU law as it 
stands. The consequences for the rule of law are drastic: all the principles invoked by the 
ECJ to justify giving EU law the upper hand in Opinion 2/13 are procedural, while the 
problems that the reliance on the ECHR is there to solve are substantive. Curing substantive 
deficiencies of the EU legal order with the remedies confined to autonomy and direct effect 
is a logical flaw plaguing the EU legal system, which puzzles the most renowned 
commentators.140 One cannot quarrel about the roses when the forests are burning. To agree 
with Eleanor Sharpston and Daniel Sarmiento, ‘in the balance between individual rights and 
primacy, the Court in Opinion 2/13 has fairly clearly sided with the latter. The losers under 
Opinion 2/13 are not the Member State of the signatory States of the Council of Europe, but 
the individual citizens of the European Union’.141 This is so, one must add, not only because 
of the potential reduction of the level of human rights protection. Rather, it is due to the 
fact that the EU, as Opinion 2/13 made clear, boasts an overwhelming potential to 
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6. Enforcement is not a panacea: as a conclusion 
 
The core question which emerges in the light of the discussion above, is how to ensure that 
the EU’s own approach to the rule of law does not undermine, if not destroy, adherence to 
the principle of the rule of law in the Member States, which are, in fact, compliant with the 
values listed in Article 2 TEU. We submit that such an understanding of the rule of law cannot 
possibly lead to the much-needed solution of the outstanding problems. Instead, the most 
mature answer to the problems should necessarily involve not only the reform of the 
enforcement mechanisms, but the reform of the Union as such, as the supranational law 
should be made more aware of the values it is obliged by the Treaties to respect and also, 
crucially, to aspire to protect at both the national and supranational levels. Instead of hiding 
behind the veil of the procedural purity banners of autonomy, supremacy and the like, EU 
law should embrace the rule of law as an institutional ideal.143 This implies, inter alia, 
eventual substantive limitations on the acquis of the Union as well as taking Article 2 TEU 
values to heart in the context of the day-to-day functioning of the Union, elevating the 
values above the instrumentalism marking them today. The result would be an emergence 
of a supranational constitutional system at the EU level, which would be truer to the glorious 
‘constitutional’ label, and which would play a significantly more productive role in solving 
the backsliding challenges in Hungary and Poland, where the war against all what we believe 



















                                            
 
 
142 See, further, D. Kochenov ‘Is There EU Rule of Law?’, op. cit. 
143 Cf. G. Palombella, È possibile la legalità globale?, op. cit. 
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